Tariff Tactics

Liquidation Without Injunction: What the CIT’s AGS Ruling Means for IEEPA Tariff Refunds

I. Introduction: CIT Injunction Denial — A Procedural Ruling with Practical Consequences

Yesterday, a panel of the U.S. Court of International Trade (“CIT”) issued an important slip opinion denying a group of importers’ motion to enjoin the liquidation of tariffs imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”).  AGS Co. Auto. Sols. v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., No. 25-00255, slip op. 25-154 (Ct. Int’l Trade Dec. 15, 2025).  These tariffs—sometimes referred to as “reciprocal,” “fentanyl,” or “Liberation Day” tariffs—are the focus of the Supreme Court’s forthcoming decision which may resolve whether IEEPA authorizes tariff imposition at all.  See Trump v V.O.S. Selections, Inc., No. 25-250, 2025 WL 2601020 (2025).  

The AGS ruling is narrow.  Judges Gary Katzmann, Timothy Reif and Jane Restani did not pass on the legality of the IEEPA tariffs themselves, nor did they address whether importers will ultimately be entitled to refunds if those tariffs are invalidated.  Instead, the panel said that because the CIT has the power to order reliquidation of entries, the prospect of liquidation of IEEPA tariffs does not warrant injunctive relief.

This seemingly narrow decision carries practical consequences for importers.  By allowing liquidation to proceed without injunction, the ruling suggests that importers may need to focus less on interim judicial relief and more on managing ongoing administrative deadlines and engaging directly with Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”).  In addition, importers should note the AGS panel’s subtle departure from Judge Kelly’s liquidation harm analysis four years ago in In re Section 301 Cases, 524 F. Supp. 3d 1355, 1358–59, 1366 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2021) (granting preliminary injunction suspending liquidation of tariff entries of disputed legality).  The departure may impact importers in later litigation, also discussed below.

II. What the CIT Did—and Did Not—Decide

The CIT held that the AGS plaintiffs failed to show irreparable harm, reasoning that the Court has “’explicit power to order reliquidation and refunds where the government has unlawfully exacted duties[,]” (quoting In re Sec. 301 Cases at 1363)  and that the availability of post-decision remedies undercut the need for injunctive relief.  AGS Co. Auto. Sols., slip op. at 6 (citing Sumecht N.A., Inc. v. United States, 923 F.3d 1340, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2019)).  The CIT further held that the possibility of delay in obtaining tariff refunds is insufficient to support injunctive relief. Id. at 4 n1.

At the same time, the CIT did not decide whether IEEPA authorizes tariff imposition, nor did it determine whether importers whose entries liquidate before the Supreme Court’s decision will be entitled to refunds.

The AGS ruling therefore should not be read as an endorsement of the IEEPA tariffs or as a determination that liquidation poses no practical risk.  Rather, it reflects the panel’s conclusion that the plaintiffs had not shown that liquidation pending further review would result in irreparable harm warranting injunctive relief.  That procedural determination sets the stage for the more difficult remedial questions that may arise if the Supreme Court ultimately limits or rejects the government’s asserted IEEPA authority.

III. The AGS Departure from CIT Section 301 Analysis and Impact to Importers

The CIT previously addressed harm from liquidation of tariff entries of disputed legality in its 2021 decision in In re Section 301 Cases.  There, the Court granted injunctive relief, holding that the “potential unavailability of reliquidation or refund . . . sufficiently demonstrates irreparable harm.”  In re. Sec. 301 Cases, at1362.  Notably, the CIT did not assume arguendo that it possesses authority to order reliquidation.  To the contrary, Judge Kelly observed that “the Court of Appeals has cast sufficient doubt as to the scope of that authority” to justify injunctive relief.  Id. at 1363.  Crucially, the In re Section 301 Cases Court did not require plaintiffs to prove that reliquidation was impossible—only that it was sufficiently uncertain that liquidation posed a serious risk of foreclosing relief.  Id. at 1362.

The AGS panel distinguished its decision from the Section 301 litigation, relying on statements by the Government that it would not oppose post-decision efforts to order reliquidation or refunds if the IEEPA tariffs are ultimately held unauthorized.  See AGS, at 4, 6.  The panel further noted that judicial estoppel would prevent the Government from adopting an inconsistent position following a final resolution in V.O.S. Selections.  This differs from the In re Section 301 Cases, where the Government specifically asked the court “to deny Plaintiff's motion” “without reference to the availability, or not, of reliquidation as a remedy.”  See In re. Sec. 301 Cases, at 1363 n.7.

As a practical matter, if the Government does not oppose reliquidation, there is no apparent reason why a CIT reliquidation order would be subject to challenge in an IEEPA refund case.  At the same time, the AGS decision does not take seriously the possibility, however remote, that the CIT lacks authority to order reliquidation in certain circumstances, nor does it engage with the appellate decisions cited by Judge Kelly that cast doubt on the scope of that authority.  See Shinyei Corp. of America v. United States, 355 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Ugine & Alz Belg. v. United States, 452 F.3d 1289, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2006); American Signature, Inc. v. United States, 598 F.3d 816, 829 (Fed. Cir. 2010) & Sumecht N.A., Inc. v. United States, 923 F.3d 1340, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2019).

Viewed together, the decisions reflect an important difference in approach.  The AGS decision treats liquidation as an economic harm, whereas In re Section 301 Cases treated it as a remedial foreclosure.  In essence, AGS views liquidation as imposing a temporary economic injury capable of later remedy, where In re Section 301 Cases framed liquidation as a procedural event that could deprive the CIT of power to grant relief.  Compare AGS at 7 (“Having found no irreparable harm, the court need not consider the remaining preliminary injunction factors”) with In Re Sec. 301 Cases at 1366 (“. . . we must conclude that liquidation will result in irreparable economic harm.”).

The different approach in AGS may be prudential (not doctrinal), reflecting institutional restraint while the Supreme Court reviews the core statutory question and the Government maintains that it will not oppose later relief.  Whether doctrinal or prudential, this distinction matters.  Absent appellate reversal, AGS means importers will lose motions to enjoin liquidation of IEEPA tariff entries at this time.  But because AGS does not analyze the statutory limits on reliquidation authority, importers should not read the decision as a definitive ruling on reliquidation authority in IEEPA cases.

Importers are therefore left to weigh the risk that the Government attempts to advance an inconsistent position on reliquidation through arguments that reliquidation authority is quasi-jurisdictional, or that a change in the law justifies inconsistent positions.  This means the CIT’s evolving approach increases pressure on importers to navigate administrative deadlines—such as CBP protest timelines—without the safety of interim judicial protection.

IV. Practical Implications for Importers Pending the Supreme Court’s Decision

The AGS decision signals that importers should not assume that pending constitutional or statutory challenges will suspend interim customs administration.  This yields three practical takeaways.

First, entries subject to IEEPA tariffs will liquidate according to CBP’s standard procedures.  Once liquidation occurs, the availability of relief may depend on whether importers have preserved their rights through timely protests or other administrative mechanisms.

Second, the CIT may be less receptive to injunctions based solely on uncertainty about future remedies, at least where the Government represents that it will not oppose post-liquidation relief.  Whether those representations ultimately translate into effective relief remains an open question.

Third, AGS highlights the importance of procedural posture and timing in IEEPA tariff litigation.  Importers considering challenges to IEEPA tariffs may need to evaluate parallel strategies, including administrative protests.

In sum, the AGS decision adds complexity to the landscape importers must navigate while awaiting the Supreme Court’s ruling.  Even if the Court ultimately finds the IEEPA tariffs unauthorized, the path to tariff recovery may turn on actions taken before that decision issues.

V. Conclusion

The AGS decision underscores that procedural posture—not just substantive legality—may shape the availability of tariff relief in IEEPA cases.  As the Supreme Court considers the scope of the President’s emergency tariff authority, importers should remain focused on preserving administrative remedies to ensure available refunds.  Tariff Tactics will continue to track these developments as the IEEPA litigation landscape evolves.

For further information regarding the matters discussed in this post, please contact Tariff Tactics author and HNRK partner Siddartha Rao.

srao@hnrklaw.com | 212-689-8808